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Summary
This paper explores the developments of the contemporary Croatian citizen-
ship regime, with particular focus on the ones that took place after Croatian 
accession to the EU. The first two stages of development of Croatian citizen-
ship regime, from the 1990s until the Croatian membership to the EU, are 
focused on the consolidation of the status and rights dimensions of citizen-
ship. The aftermath of the EU accession (re)introduced identity in the focus 
of the Croatian citizenship debates, particularly when it comes to issues of 
the status and rights of two categories of citizens: Serb minority and veterans 
of the Homeland War. This paper will argue that the dynamics of these deve-
lopments is impossible to understand without: a) comprehending the specific 
legal tradition and political context that shaped the circumstances of the foun-
dation of the Croatian state; b) understanding the role of the Homeland War as 
the symbolic foundation of the Croatian statehood; c) the development of the 
new statuses and categories of citizens that emerged from the constellation of 
this context and symbolic foundations of the state; and, finally, d) how the in-
stitutionalization of these statuses shape the context and agenda for Croatian-
citizenship-related debates. 
Keywords: Croatia, Homeland War, Citizenship Regime, Serb Minority, Vete-
ran of the Homeland War
Introduction
In July 2013 Croatia became the 28th EU member state. For the statehood consoli-
dation of this young democracy it was a fulfilment of the more than two decades 
old political dream.1 In early 1990s, this country faced complex challenges that all 
1 This paper is a product of research funded by the grant of the EC FP7 Project bEUcitizen 
(Barriers towards EU Citizenship), under grant agreement 320294. It is also a shorter version of 
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former socialist countries were dealing with in their transition from socialism to 
democracy; adapting to the free market economy and development of political in-
stitutions of representative democracy. Nevertheless, Croatia faced additional chal-
lenges that stemmed from the particular conditions of violent break-up of the for-
mer Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). 
With the dissolution of the SFRY, Croatia had to set the boundaries and define 
criteria of membership of its newly created independent state. The novel conception 
of Croatian state as exclusive nation-state of ethnic Croat majority was resisted by 
the demographic and political realities inherited from the former Socialist Repub-
lic of Croatia, where the Serb minority held a special constitutional position within 
the Croatian constitutional setting. Disputes over the nature and the future of the 
new Croatian polity were resolved through the violent conflict, the consequences of 
which shape the realities of Croatian citizenship regime until the present day. 
The existing research on the Croatian citizenship defines several stages of the 
development of the Croatian citizenship regime (Ragazzi and Štiks, 2009; Djuric, 
2010; Štiks, 2010b; Koska, 2011, 2012; Ragazzi, Štiks and Koska, 2013; Baričević 
and Hoffman, 2014). The first decade of Croatian independence was marked by the 
disputes over the status dimension of citizenship, where the criteria for the member-
ship in the newly formed citizenry had to be defined. Within this stage, the gene-
rous provisions for the inclusion of ethnic Croats regardless of their residency have 
been enacted, while the provisions for exclusion of certain categories of non-Croat 
ethnic residents were implemented. The second stage, which literature perceives 
to have started in 2000 (Petričušić, 2004; Jović and Lamont, 2010; Djuric, 2010; 
Štiks, 2010b; Koska, 2012), was marked by liberalization of the discussions over 
the rights dimension of Croatian citizenship. The final stage involves the changes 
and impact on the Croatian citizenship regime that emerged in the aftermath of the 
Croatian membership to the EU. Since Croatia has been an EU member state for 
only three years, the exploration of the changes of the Croatian citizenship regime 
with the EU have not been addressed so far. The task of this study is to explore the 
key political debates emerged after the accession in the context of the previous de-
velopments of the Croatian citizenship regime. 
Throughout all three stages, the idea of membership to the EU played a very 
important role in the Croatian project of nation and statehood building; during the 
1990s it was perceived as a long term guarantee of Croatian sovereignty, statehood 
a Deliverable 4.7.: Report on Croatia: Croatian citizenship regime and contested categories of 
Croatian citizens: Ethnic Croats abroad, Serb minority and Croatian defenders of the Homeland 
War, prepared for the Working Package 4 of the project. Authors want to thank Mia Jerman and 
Livija Stanišić for their technical and administrative support during the research conducted for 
the purposes of this report.
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stability and economic prosperity. The 2000s until the accession were marked by 
democratic changes and the legislative reification of the discriminatory policies and 
shortcomings of the regime of the 1990s, which were largely influenced by meeting 
the requirements of the EU accession. The last stage, which has started in the eve of 
the accession and continues until today, is marked by the return of the identity dis-
putes regarding the Croatian state and the membership identity. As this paper will 
highlight, the first three years of EU membership did not build on the previous de-
cades’ accomplishments of more inclusionary policies towards minorities; instead, 
Croatia has witnessed the revival of the nationalist discourse which is today in the 
media often framed under the term “conservative revolution”.
As Bellamy argues (2004: 5), the analysis of citizenship has to be scrutinized 
within the context of ideological languages of political actors constructed to address 
the issues emerging from the interaction between the state and society in a given 
national community. Hence, analysis of Croatian citizenship development proposed 
in this paper will be offered through the lens of citizenship regime, a concept de-
veloped by Shaw and Štiks. Here, citizenship regime represents a concept that “en-
compasses a range of different legal statuses viewed in their wider political context, 
which are central to the exercise of civil rights, political membership and full socio-
economic membership in a particular territory” (Shaw and Štiks, 2010: 5).
The key features of Croatian citizenship legislation, unlike in the other post-
socialist countries, have remained robust over time. Even besides the several chan-
ges of the legislation since 1991, its key features reflect the institutionalized notion 
of Croatian polity primarily imagined as a nation-state of trans-territorial Croat eth-
nic community (Ragazzi, 2009a, 2009b; Štiks, 2010b; Koska, 2011, 2012). How-
ever, the comprehensive analysis of Croatian citizenship regime and its identity 
cannot be fully understood without the detailed exploration of the developments in 
the status, identity and rights of the Serb minority and veteran soldiers of the Home-
land War. It may be argued that the Homeland War represents a constitutive story of 
the development of the modern Croatian states. Hence, the debates over the status, 
rights and identities of these two categories of citizens stem from the ascribed iden-
tities and roles they had during this event.
We will argue that the changes and the dynamics of Croatian citizenship regime 
are impossible to understand without a) comprehending the specific legal tradition 
and political context that shaped the circumstances of the foundation of the Croatian 
state; b) understanding the role of the Homeland War as the symbolic foundation of 
the Croatian statehood; c) the development of the new statuses and categories of citi-
zens that emerged from the constellation of this context and symbolic foundations 
of the state (the scope of rights ascribed to each of these groups is made according 
to the perceived role that each of them had during the constitutive stage of Croatian 
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citizenship development); and, finally, d) the institutionalization of these statuses 
shape the context and agenda for any present-day citizenship-related debates.
Nationalizing State, Dimensions of Citizenship and Constitutive Stories: 
Setting the Framework for the Analysis of Croatian Citizenship Regime
As Koska (2013: 114) argues, the fundamental features of the contemporary Croa-
tian nation-state include the transnational conception of ethnic Croat community as 
a main holder of ownership of the state, and secondly, considering that from such a 
conception the bonds between the individual and state transgress the formal citizen-
ship status and residence, citizenship policies are impacted by the forces internal 
and external to the Croatian state. Furthermore, analysis has to delineate between 
the dimensions of citizenship (which will be under particular empirical and analyti-
cal scrutiny), and the context which frames the arena within which the debates be-
tween the key stakeholders and between the competing ideas over the content and 
scope of the citizenship rights happen.
For analytical purposes, this study departs from Cristian Joppke’s (2007) pro-
posal of comprehensive citizenship theory where three main dimensions are defined: 
status, rights and identity. The dimension of status denotes the criteria of the formal 
membership to political community and legal practices for membership acquisition. 
The rights dimension is concerned with immunities, rights and privileges connected 
to specific status and categories that stem from the formal membership. Finally, the 
identity dimension of citizenship ranges from the views held by the ordinary people 
to the official views propagated by the states (ibid.: 44). As Joppke argues, these di-
mensions do not operate in separation but are interdependent. Any changes of crite-
ria of formal membership may produce serious traumatic consequences for affected 
groups and trigger novel claims for the scope of rights either from the old bearers 
of the formal membership status or the new members of political communities who 
may use their franchise to place new issues on the citizenship policies agenda. Once 
disputes over the rights dimension are solved, they affect the dominant perception 
of the novel identity of citizenship. As Joppke concludes, the resulted perceptions of 
identity may produce competing identity conceptions among various categories of 
citizens and the formal state officials.
The Croatian case provides a unique experimental ground for the study of the 
developments of the citizenship status, rights and identity, as Croatia had to estab-
lish the criteria for the novel democratic citizenry of the newly established inde-
pendent state. However, even under such circumstances the design of citizenship 
policies did not start ex nihilo; the political and legal arena for elite’s implementa-
tion of, in Benedict Anderson’s (1983) terms, the process of “imagining the commu-
nity” and defining the criteria for new Croatian polity and citizenry, was determined 
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by the specific political events of the time, previous legal structures and competing 
ideas of the nature of the future polity. 
In order to understand these starting constitutional points, the analysis will 
rely on Brubaker’s notion of citizenship as a powerful instrument of closure (1992, 
2015). As the arguments will show, since the 1990s but with continuity until to-
day, Croatia continues to exercise the features of a “nationalizing state” (Brubaker, 
1996), being imagined as a state “of” and “for” a particular ethnic nation. Its citizen-
ship policies set in the 1990s have established the particular notion of nationhood 
tradition, which once institutionalized governs and sets the trajectory for future de-
bates on the nature and scope of reach of Croatian citizenship. 
The Croatian nationhood tradition develops on two primary notions: firstly, 
on the idea of the Croatian state as a fulfillment of the perennial claim of Croatian 
people to have their nation-state, advocated by the Croatian nationalist elites in the 
eve of the break-up of the SFRY and which is a fundamental pillar of Croatian con-
stitution; and secondly, on the Homeland War as a collective traumatic event, as 
well as a powerful constitutive story and foundation of the modern Croatian iden-
tity. 
As Rogers B. Smith (2001) notes, the prevalent role of constitutive stories in 
the people-building politics can be defined as a “wide variety of accounts that pre-
sent membership in a particular people as somehow intrinsic to who its members 
really are” (ibid.: 79). The characteristics of these stories are central to intrinsic 
meaning of individuals’ self-perception, they are intergenerational and inspire trust 
and worth among its addressees. They are normative in character, less tangible to 
evidence and they go beyond the mere instrumental reasons to belong to the im-
agined people, hence provide a rationale for the membership, which is enduringly 
important (ibid.: 81).
The proposed analysis recognizes that any particular narrative does not evolve 
in the political vacuum, but is always the reflection of the competing discour-
ses in the politically complex and often emotionally charged social environment. 
What makes the story of Croatian citizenship especially challenging for the analy-
sis is that events of the 1990s have produced, in Bauböck’s terms (Bauböck, 2010), 
a complex citizenship constellation; Croatian citizenship regime today regulates or 
makes claim to regulate several categories of individuals with formal and/or infor-
mal membership in more than one state. It includes ethnic Croats abroad without 
Croatian citizenship; ethnic Croats abroad with Croatian citizenship; non-ethnic 
Croats who are Croatian citizens abroad; different categories of Croatian residents 
without Croatian citizenship, and finally Croatian citizens who have a residency in 
Croatia and who either are members of the Croat majority or belong to one of the 
national minority categories. 
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In such a constellation, the Croatian state acts as the external kin-state for its 
ethnic compatriots abroad, but also has to deal with the complex stances that stem 
from the demands and claims made by the external kin-states of its national minori-
ties. This analysis will aim to recognize that each citizenship outcome reflects the 
dynamic nature of the relational fields and decisions of actors within these fields 
that shape the context within which the citizenship policies are made. However, as 
Brubaker argues, “the stances emerging within each of the fields may shape the per-
ceptions and representation of the external fields, but may take shape in response to 
perceptions and representations of developments in that external field” (1996: 69).
The Evolution of the Croatian Citizenship Regime 
and the Development of the Homeland War 
as a Constitutive Traumatic Story of Croatian Nationhood
Newly established states after the break-up of the SFRY faced a number of diffi-
culties and challenges during the process of transition to democracy. Most of them 
related to the consolidation of new statehoods, but also to the determination of the 
membership criteria for novel citizenries (Koska, 2011, 2012; Ragazzi, Štiks and 
Koska, 2013; Baričević and Hoffman, 2014). In almost all former Yugoslav repub-
lics, the nationalist parties won the first democratic elections (Hayden, 1992), hence 
they were entitled to formulate the contents of the new constitutions and determine 
criteria for the membership of the emerging political communities. 
However, demographic realities were often in disjunction with the national 
imaginaries of such elites, as nationally homogenous states ought to be imagined 
in otherwise ethnically heterogeneous territories (Koska, 2012: 397). In order to re-
solve such disputes, as Štiks argues, the citizenship policies were utilized as a po-
werful tool for ethnic engineering (Štiks, 2010a: 9-11) resulting in the discrimina-
tory citizenship policies and practices. With the end of the 1990s and the emergence 
of EU membership as the primary political goal, in order to meet the accession cri-
teria, post-Yugoslav states had to liberalize their often exclusive citizenship regimes 
established during the constitutive stages of their statehood (Koska, 2011: 2). 
Croatia was not an exception from this model. In comparison with the other 
post-Yugoslav republics, during the 1990s it established the most stable citizen-
ship legislation. The core criteria for the formal membership to the Croatian politi-
cal community have not been substantially questioned until today. Its exclusionary 
practices of the 1990s consolidated the imaginary of the nationalist elites of Croa-
tian state for Croat people, while the negotiations with the EU during the 2000s led 
to partial liberalization of the citizenship-related policies. These changes were di-
rected to a greater inclusion of the minorities and partial overcoming of the conse-
quences of the previous discriminatory practices. 
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In order to examine the developments of the citizenship regime in Croatia, it 
is important to provide a brief overview of the citizenship legislation that regulat-
ed membership before 1991, the year which represents the critical juncture for the 
present-day Croatian citizenship regime. The citizenship practices enacted after this 
date did not adequately acknowledge the political, legal and social realities of the 
citizenship regimes that preceded the constitution of the Croatian state. Instead, the 
new citizenship legislation will move towards the inclusion of the new categories of 
individuals and exclusion of those categories that did not fit the national imagina-
ries of the new Croatian elites. In addition to a detailed summary of the key legisla-
tive features of the 1991 Law on Croatian Citizenship, an overview of the Home-
land War as the constitutive story will be provided.
Croatian Citizenship before the 1990s
In the beginning of the twentieth century, Croatia was a member of the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire. Due to the fact that it was divided in three lands (Croatia, Slavonia 
and Dalmatia) whose governance was separated between the Hungarian and Austri-
an administrative authorities, citizenship practices were regulated by two separate 
citizenship legislations. Dalmatian citizenship was regulated by the Law on Austri-
an Citizenship based on the 1811 (1867) Austrian Civil Code, whereas citizenship 
in Croatia and Slavonia was regulated by the 1879 Law on Hungarian Citizenship 
(Ragazzi, Štiks and Koska, 2013: 2; Koska, 2011: 7).
Following the break-up of the Empire with the end of the First World War, and 
the formation of a new South Slavic state which included Croatia, Slovenia and Ser-
bia in 1918, a single citizenship legislation needed to be passed. However, it took a 
whole decade for that to happen, until the enactment of the Law on Citizenship of 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Ragazzi, Štiks and Koska, 2013: 2; Koska, 2011: 7). 
As Štiks (2016: 59-74) argues, this citizenship had to give impetus to the creation 
of a single Yugoslav identity and promote the political integration of all nations to 
the new state. However, such endeavors were doomed to failure since they were tar-
geting the territory within which during the previous decades of national enlighten-
ments national intelligentsia already managed to construct the distinct Croat, Serb 
and Slovene identities.
After the dissolution of the Kingdom during the Second World War (WWII), on 
the territory of Croatia, with the support of the Axis powers, the quisling Indepen-
dent State of Croatia (NDH) was established. Under the notorious “Ustasha” Croa-
tian regime NDH was responsible for the genocide of thousands of Serbs, Jews, 
Roma and other minorities, but it also persecuted ethnic Croats who were opposing 
the state ideology. In 1941, many Croats welcomed the establishment of NDH as 
the escape from the previous Serbian hegemonic regime. However, due to recogni-
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tion of the criminal nature of the new regime (Goldstein, 2006), by the end of the 
War the majority of Croats and Croatian Serbs were participating in the war on the 
side of Yugoslav resistance struggle led by the Communist party.
With the end of WWII the new Yugoslavia was established, but this time as a 
Socialist Federation. By learning from previous regime mistakes, new communist 
elites did not insist on the unified Yugoslav identity and recognized the existence 
of separate republics. The state was organized on federative principles, and these 
characteristics were reflected in the new citizenship legislation (Koska, 2011: 7). As 
Omejec argues (1998), the federative citizenship regime of Yugoslavia was organ-
ized around three key principles. Firstly, the principle of unity was in power, which 
determined the co-existence of federal and republic citizenship. Secondly, ius san-
guinis was the primary principle of citizenship acquisition. Finally, there was a prin-
ciple of exclusivity by which every Yugoslav citizen could be a citizen of only one 
republic (ibid.: 103). 
As a number of scholars argue (Medvedović, 1998; Omejec, 1998; Ragazzi, 
Štiks and Koska, 2013), in the Yugoslav citizenship regime, the federative citizen-
ship status was the primary source of the citizenship rights, while the republican citi-
zenship had little practical value. Socialist elites perceived the federative citizenship 
as a vehicle for ensuring equality of all Yugoslavs regardless of their residency or 
nationality. In practice, the residency, not republican citizenship, was the formal sta-
tus through which one could regulate any administrative issues related to his rights. 
Hence, with large-scale migrations of individuals within Yugoslavia, people 
would often change their residency from one republic to another, without many 
concerns over the status of their republican citizenship. Since the republican citi-
zenship was acquired according to ius sanguinis principle, the consequence of such 
practices were that in reality, even the children of such migrants did not possess the 
citizenship of the republic in which they were born and lived, but were instead re-
gistered according to their parents’ republican citizenship. While this complex citi-
zenship constellation did not pose any practical issues during Yugoslavia, with the 
break-up of the federation many citizens would wake up in the new states to realize 
that they are foreigners in their own state (Ragazzi, Štiks and Koska, 2013; Koska, 
2011).
Croatian Citizenship since 1991
The last years of the former Yugoslavia were marked by the constitutional and eco-
nomic crisis. It started with the death of Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito in 1980, 
continued throughout the decade and finished in bloody conflict which marked the 
end of almost fifty-year-long idea of “Brotherhood and Unity” among Yugoslav na-
tions, nationalities and republics, making them still traumatized on the individual, 
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as well as the collective level. With Tito’s death nationalism gradually gained impe-
tus as the dominant principle of politics in Yugoslav republics. Starting from Serbia 
where Slobodan Milošević utilized it in order to win the power struggles within the 
Serbian communist party (Kasapović, 1996), it easily spread over to other republics 
as a reflex on the perceived aggressive and authoritarian tendencies of Milošević’s 
politics. 
The popularity of nationalist ideas became evident in the results of the first 
democratic elections in all republics. In Croatia, by building on the growing public 
perception of the threat to Croatia from Serbian nationalist politics, Croatian Demo-
cratic Union (HDZ) won the elections. Even though the HDZ won relative majority, 
according to the majority electoral rule set for the first elections in Croatia by the re-
formed Croatian communist party (Grdešić, 1992), the HDZ won almost two thirds 
of parliamentary seats in the first democratically constituted Croatian Parliament. 
This enabled the HDZ to promote their ethnical conception of Croatian nation as a 
foundation of the Croatian state. 
The new Constitution enacted in December 1990 proclaimed “the Republic of 
Croatia as the national state of the Croatian people and the state of members of other 
nations and minorities who are its citizens”. These constitutional changes were not 
welcomed by the Croatian Serbs, who perceived the replacement of their status of 
constitutive nation enjoyed during socialism with the status of minority as a pos-
sible threat to their security and position in the new Croatian state (Koska, 2011: 
8; Ragazzi, Štiks and Koska, 2013: 5; Koska, 2013: 401).2 The Serbian nationalist 
elites from Belgrade, who portrayed the new Croatian authorities as the revival of 
the WWII Ustasha regime, further fueled their fears.
Within the context of the escalation of political hostilities in Yugoslavia, in 
May 1991 Croatia held a referendum on Croatian independence where 94.7% of 
voters voted for independence. The vast majority of Croatian Serbs boycotted the 
referendum. Nevertheless, the result led to the Croatian declaration of independ-
ence on 25 June 1991. The European Community and the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe imposed Croatia with a three months moratorium on the 
independence decision, so officially Croatia proclaimed its independence with the 
termination of this period on 8 October 1991.
The Croatian Parliament enacted the first citizenship legislation on the same 
date when the Croatian independence and separation from SFRY was proclaimed. 
The new Law on Croatian Citizenship (LCC) built on the constitutionally defined 
2 According to Article 1 of the Constitution of Socialist Republic of Croatia, Croatia was defined 
as a nation-state of Croats, state of Serbs in Croatia and state of other nations and nationalities 
who live in it. 
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Croat ethnic community as a titular nation of the Croatian state (Ragazzi, Štiks and 
Koska, 2013: 5). Two main pillars of LCC were legal continuity with citizenship of 
the Socialist Republic of Croatia and ethnic criterion (Croatian ethnicity) (Omejec, 
1998: 99; Ragazzi, Štiks and Koska, 2013: 5; Koska, 2013: 401).
This meant that the previous republican citizenship, not the residency, became 
the primary criterion for the membership to new Croatian citizenry. In cases where 
individuals did not possess Croatian citizenship, but were registered residents of 
Croatia, their application for citizenship status was determined according to their 
ethnicity. If they were ethnic Croats they were included to the citizenry ex lege; if 
they were of any other ethnicity, they had to naturalize through complex naturaliza-
tion procedures designed for foreigners. As Croatian citizenship did not recognize 
the right of the dual citizenship for this category of applicants, even if an individual 
had met all residency criteria for naturalization, he would still not be able to provide 
a proof of dismissal from the previous republican citizenship. Simply, at the time 
other republics did not yet recognize Croatian independence or were in open con-
flict with Croatia regarding the future of the Yugoslav heritage.
On the other hand, LCC did not treat all applicants to citizenship through natu-
ralization equally either. The provisions of LCC allowed a facilitated naturaliza-
tion for ethnic Croats abroad. As Štiks (2010b) argues, the new Croatian citizen-
ship regime distinguished between at least four categories of individuals who had 
citizenship claims vis-à-vis the state. The category of “included” involved all who 
had citizenship of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia and Croat residents who 
were citizens of any other former Yugoslav Republic. The category of “invited” was 
related to all ethnic Croats regardless of their residency. The category of “excluded” 
included minority residents who were citizens of other republics. However, this 
provision mostly targeted the members of the local Serb community. The category 
of “self-excluded” included the rebelled Serb population, which resisted the estab-
lishment of the new Croatian state. 
This situation of ethnic engineering (Štiks, 2010b; Koska, 2013: 401) fueled 
Croatian Serbs’ rebellion, and consequently, Croatian war with the Yugoslav ar-
my. By the establishment of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serb Krajina, Serbs 
who were residents of the territory were Croatian citizens but they opted for self-
exclusion (Koska, 2013: 401). However, from the perspective of Croatian Con-
stitutional Court, they were still considered legal citizens of Croatia. However, 
the position of the Croatian state vis-à-vis this category would change in 1995 in 
the aftermath of the military operation Storm, when the military campaign of the 
Croatian army to liberate the territories under Serb control resulted in mass exo-
dus of more than 200,000 Serbs from Croatia. The citizenship-related policies en-
acted in this period fit the descriptions which authors such as Hayden (1996) call 
Koska, V., Matan, A., Croatian Citizenship Regime and Traumatized Categories...
129
bureaucratic ethnic cleansing, and we will reflect on these policies later in this 
paper.
The Law on Croatian Citizenship from 1991 was still in force and not signifi-
cantly changed up until December 2011, when the Croatian Parliament passed the 
Law on Modifications and Amendments of the Law on Croatian Citizenship. It was 
directed towards administrative upgrading and improvement, rather than substan-
tive changes of the Croatian citizenship regime (Ragazzi, Štiks and Koska, 2013: 
8). The ius sanguinis remains the primary mode for acquisition of Croatian citizen-
ship, while the naturalization policies still provide the facilitated provisions for in-
corporation of non-resident Croats.3
War in Croatia
The first signs of the conflict in Croatia emerged in August of 1990, followed by 
rebellion of the part of the Serbian population in the areas were they consisted the 
majority of population. The events occurred in the area that became known as the 
self-proclaimed rebel Republic of Serb Krajina (SAO Krajina) (Glenny, 1992: 1-31; 
Goldstein, 2001: 212-226). 
The rebellion spread through almost the entire area of Banija, Kordun, parts of 
Lika region and of Dalmatinska Zagora, but also Posavina, the region around towns 
of Glina and Dvor, and in Western Slavonian town of Pakrac. The barricades con-
sisting of trees and rocks were set on the main road connecting the inland of Croa-
tia with the coast in an attempt to block the passage of the Croatian police forces 
into Krajina, where the plebiscite was to be held on declaring independence from 
the Croatian state. The act of road blockage was named The Log Revolution by the 
media and represents the first serious outburst of the Serb separatist claims. These 
events took place only a few months after the first multi-party elections in Croa-
tia. What started as an act of disobedience towards the HDZ Croatian authorities, 
evolved into a severe armed conflict, resulting with proclamation of independence 
of so-called SAO Krajina within the Croatian state borders.
The rebels’ plan was to obtain control of the abovementioned areas through 
taking full command over the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) armories. Most of the 
officers in charge of armories were Serbs by nationality, and the plan included re-
leasing from duty officers and soldiers that were of Croatian nationality whilst en-
suring they surrender their armory before leaving. 
In the eyes of Croatian authorities, domestic and international public, the ter-
ritory was considered to be under occupation, since the Krajina leaders refused any 
3 For a more detailed review of the Croatian citizenship legislation, see: Ragazzi, Štiks and 
Koska, 2013; Koska, 2011.
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attempts at reconciliation with the legally elected Croatian government. The rebels 
disputed those claims, responding with building separate state institutions. The self-
proclaimed leaders of SAO Krajina were former dentist Milan Babić, previously the 
mayor of Knin, and former police officer Milan Martić, who became the Minister 
of Internal Affairs of Krajina. Both were in close correspondence with the Serbian 
nationalistic elites in Belgrade, including the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević 
(Glenny, 1992: 16-21). 
The first armed conflicts took place in April 1991, along with the gradual align-
ment of JNA with Serbian rebels. By the end of 1991, JNA joined the attack on 
Croatian strongholds, together with voluntary troops from Serbia. These processes 
were accompanied with strong nationalism among the Serbian political elites, which 
strives to realize the idea of so-called Greater Serbia, establishing its desired future 
border on the line spreading from Virovitica via Karlovac to Karlobag.
These events outraged the Croatian public and were portrayed by the govern-
ment-controlled mainstream media as a direct attack on Croatian state sovereignty 
and independence. With time, those events and the upcoming war would become 
the cornerstone of Croatian cultural victim trauma. The Homeland War therefore 
shaped the formation of Croatian national identity in opposition to the rebel territo-
rial claims, and gave additional weight to the perception of the war as a symbolic 
act for liberation of Croatia from its inner and outer nemesis.
The perception of the resistance as crucial for the independence and preserva-
tion of the Croatian state can be seen most clearly through focusing on the attacks 
on two Croatian towns in 1991, Vukovar and Dubrovnik. The troops of JNA were 
sent from Belgrade to besiege Vukovar, while Dubrovnik was attacked by the JNA 
troops located in Montenegro. Even though the two towns had no strategical im-
portance for the course of war actions, the aggressor marked them for destruction 
relying on the effect of shock and discouragement the destruction would create 
among the Croatian military troops and Croatian public (Žunec, 1998: 111). Both 
towns suffered wide-scale destruction, followed by deaths of hundreds of civilians 
and soldiers, leaving Vukovar destroyed and most of its inhabitants fled to refuge.
The period between 1992 and 1995 was marked by numerous diplomatic ef-
forts and negotiations, but the central events of the period were the operations for the 
liberation of the Croatian territory named “Flash” and “Storm” (Tatalović, 1996). 
The goal of the operation “Flash” was to liberate the occupied area of Western Sla-
vonia, which was under the supervision of the UN peacekeeping forces. The opera-
tion ended in May 1995, resulting with liberation of the entire area. Three months 
later, in August 1995, the operation “Storm” started, liberating the majority of the 
area of so-called SAO Krajina. The military operation “Storm” is considered to be 
the greatest triumph of the Croatian military troops in the entire course of war and 
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its success marked the end of the Homeland War. In the aftermath of the war, transi-
tional international governance between 1996 and 1998 peacefully reintegrated the 
area of Eastern Slavonia. 
The operation “Storm” resulted in many consequences for the inhabitants of 
SAO Krajina, as more than 200 thousand people, almost all Serbs, were forced to 
leave their homes and seek refuge in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and other 
European countries, resulting in what became the biggest-scale forced migration 
wave since WWII (HHO, 2001). Hence, for the Serb minority the military opera-
tion “Storm” represents a national tragedy and major source of their victim cultural 
trauma. On the other hand, the Croat majority perceives it as a national holiday, 
celebrating it under the name of “Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day” (“Dan 
pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti”).
Homeland War, International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and Declaration of the Homeland War: the Birth of the Constitutive Story
The war had a very important impact on all dimensions of the citizenship regime 
and practices in Croatia. Consequently, the war established a new category of de-
serving citizens. These were mainly the veterans of the Homeland War, whose role 
during the conflict was protected by special legislation, which on the symbolical 
level confirms their sacrifice for the establishment of the Croatian state, while on 
the other hand provides a set of special rights attributed to this status. 
Furthermore, the experience of war also produced a negative perception to-
wards the Serb minority in Croatia. In the context of the newly independent Croa-
tian state, the Serb minority in Croatia is often perceived as the enemy of the state; 
this discourse is prevalent until the present day. It derives from the autocratic go-
vernance of the first Croatian president Franjo Tuđman and the nationalist rhetoric 
the purpose of which was to call upon an ethnically homogeneous Croatia, whereas 
Serbs were described by him as a “cancer of Croatian society” and were treated as 
second-class citizens (HRW, 1998). 
Tensions were intensified after the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 by the UN Security Council, 
the role of which was to bring about reconciliation and justice. In order to establish 
a conciliatory climate in Croatia and Serbia, activities of the ICTY were directed 
towards acknowledgment of war victims and prosecuting war criminals. However, 
the results of these processes only brought about further disappointment and dis-
satisfaction, depending on the particular case in question. Until the acquittal verdict 
that the ICTY brought in the cases of two Croatian war generals, Ante Gotovina and 
Mladen Markač, in 2012, the public perception of the court was that the ICTY was 
a political court with the aim to equalize the guilt for the wars in the 1990s among 
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all conflicted sides. Perceived as the court which is set against the Croatian national 
interest, it would face strong opposition from the organizations of the Croatian ve-
teran soldiers.
In this context, it is important to emphasize the role of the Declaration on the 
Homeland War of the Croatian Parliament in 2000, enacted following strong pres-
sure by such organizations in the light of the rising tensions between Croatia and the 
ICTY, related to the indictments towards the Croatian generals. 
The Declaration consists of the emphasis on Croatian victory in the Homeland 
War, which is presented strictly as a defensive war with the background of Serbian 
aggression against Croatia and its territory. The main role in defense of Croatian 
territory belongs to the Croatian war veterans, whose contribution is perceived as a 
foundation for modern independent Croatia. As such, it is considered to be gener-
ally accepted by the Croat nation and all Croatian citizens whose main role is nur-
turing their honor and reputation. Therefore, institutionalization of constitutive nar-
ratives took place parallel with the omnipresent discourse stemming from Croatian 
war veterans, celebrating victory, justifying their operations and encouraging the 
public perception which identifies the Serb minority in Croatia with atrocities and 
aggressive tendencies of the Serb nationalist elites in the early 1990s.
Croatian Citizenship Regime and Serb Minority: 
From the Policies of Exclusion towards the Politics of Cultural Recognition
The status of the Serb minority deserves a special focus in the study of Croatian 
citizenship for at least two reasons. First, constitutionally the newly-formed state 
has deprived the Croatian Serb population of its legal status as one of the constitu-
tive peoples of the Croatian state. Second, the experience of the war established a 
collective stigma over this population as the constitutive others against which the 
identity of the Croatian state is defined. In this section, we will elaborate on the 
legislative development and the political contexts that shaped the stage of status 
determination and stage of rights debates associated to this category of Croatian 
citizens.
According to the 1991 census, the Serb population in Croatia was estimated at 
12.2 percent of the total population. During socialism, the Serb minority enjoyed 
the status of one of the titular peoples of the Croatian state. As it was previously 
noted, the emerging nationalist Croatian elites perceived this status as a threat to 
Croatian national homogeneity and designed the new Constitution within which 
Serbs received a status of national minority. Authors such as Hudelist (2014) fur-
ther emphasise that Tuđman envisioned the new Croatian state which could only 
maintain its political stability if the percentage of the Serb population should not 
exceed 5 percent of the overall population. The new Constitutional framework was 
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followed with the development of the novel citizenship regime, which in practice 
resulted with numerous obstacles and various administrative challenges towards the 
Serb population. As Jović notes, the Serb minority now feared that the new Croatian 
state would treat them as second-class citizens (Jović, 2002).4 
Meanwhile, the Croatian government tried to create an image of Croatia in the 
international community as a modern liberal state with special protection of minor-
ity rights. In order to receive international recognition, Croatia enacted the Consti-
tutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and Rights of Ethnic and National 
Minorities in Croatia (LHR) in 1991. This law confirmed the minority rights in the 
area of cultural autonomy and political representation both for newly-formed and 
old, established (e.g. Hungarian and Italian) minorities. This may be considered as 
preclude for Croatia to receive the international recognition of its neighbor coun-
tries Italy and Hungary. The law was followed with the set of bilateral agreements 
on minority protection between Croatia and the named states. This, however, was 
not the case with the Serb population in Croatia. However, the Law provided the 
provisions which allowed a high level of territorial autonomy for the local commu-
nities in which Serbs constituted the majority of the population and guaranteed the 
proportional representation in the public and political institutions for those minori-
ties who form more than eight percent of the total population.
However, those provisions were never implemented in practice, considering 
that in 1991 armed conflicts began as a rebellion of a part of the Serb community 
against Croatian authorities, declaring their own state. The political regime estab-
lished by the rebelled Serb authorities was far from liberal or democratic. During 
their control over these territories, large-scale ethnic cleansing against non-Serb 
population was conducted and more than 200,000 Croats were expelled to the ter-
ritories under the control of Croatian authorities. 
The conflict ended in 1995 with military operations “Flesh” and “Storm” with 
which Croatia regained control over most of the rebelled territory. However, the 
war had tragic consequences for the Serb minority, resulting with hundreds of thou-
sands of Serb people fleeing Croatia. The precise number of people who left Croatia 
is still a matter of dispute, but it is estimated that more than two hundred thousand 
people left to seek refuge in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and other European 
countries. The outcome of such events is reflected in Croatian demographic reali-
4 In the two interviews conducted with the representatives of Serbian minority political elites 
it was highlighted that the new provisions regarding citizenship were essential for holding up 
the positions in public administration and state offices. The proof of Croatian citizenship be-
came necessary for all employees in such institutions, hence the lack of citizenship would lead 
to loss of employment and other social rights previously exercised in the Socialist Republic of 
Croatia.
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ties: according to the 2011 census data, Croatian Serbs today in Croatia constitute 
only 4.36% of the total population. A number of scholars argue that the Croatian 
policies enacted after the flight of Serb refugees did not encourage their return, and 
rather discriminated them from full access to Croatian society (Blitz, 2003; Djuric, 
2010; Koska, 2009, 2014).
In 1995 the Croatian government passed a Law on Temporary Suspension of 
Particular Articles of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and 
Rights of Ethnic and National Minorities in Croatia, suspending the right of pro-
portional representation of the Serb population in all levels of government. Further-
more, even though the Serbs that left Croatia were nominally perceived as Croatian 
citizens by the Croatian government, administrative obstacles were introduced to 
impede their access to Croatian citizenship (Blitz, 2005: 369). The other law that 
came into force that year was the Law on Temporary Take Over and Administration 
of Certain Property (LTTO), followed by The Law on Areas of Special State Con-
cern (LASSC) in 1996. The Croatian government claimed those laws were made in 
an attempt of protecting the abandoned property of Serbs, calling previous owners 
to reclaim their ownership in 90 days. However, at the same time, due to numerous 
administrative measures, including the restrictive citizenship procedures, govern-
ment established a de facto situation in which the return of Serb refugees became 
almost impossible (Koska, 2009). Confiscated houses and other property of the re-
fugee Serbs were in most cases given to Croat nationals arrived from other parts of 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina or Vojvodina (Blitz, 2005: 368). Such measures 
were followed by strong propaganda in the Croatian media, creating the narrative in 
which all Serbian refugees were portrayed as collaborators of the aggressor, creat-
ing the sentiment in public that Croatia is better off without them, thus preventing 
the short-term possibilities for their collective return. 
The situation somewhat changed after the peaceful integration of Eastern Sla-
vonia in 1998, resulting with easier re-obtaining of citizenship rights. However, it 
was not until the 2000 elections that the coalition led by left-wing Social Democrat-
ic Party formed a new government which made substantial changes towards better-
ing the position of the Serb population in Croatia (Koska, 2011, 2013). In 2002 the 
new Constitutional Law on Rights of National Minorities (CLRNM) was passed, 
increasing the number of seats reserved for minorities in the Croatian parliament 
and granting the education and official use of minority languages. In 2003 the new 
governmental coalition led by the HDZ included the minority representatives show-
ing that they could now be perceived as partners. Croatia also began its process of 
acquiring EU membership, which included a set of recommendations and expec-
tations from the international community, including the key issues of cooperation 
with the ICTY, return of the refuge Serbs and creating a stable environment for civil 
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organizations and initiatives. The perception of the Serb minority in Croatia as a 
threat to the Croatian state or its institutions seemed to be in decline during this pe-
riod, and the rhetoric of the Croatian and Serbian authorities was directed towards 
reconciliation and settling the disputes inherited from the 1990s.
The nationalist policies of the 1990s yielded under the changed circumstances 
in which the CLRNM ensured a high standard of minority protection in Croatia. 
However, the established framework emphasizes mainly the question of cultural 
rights of national minorities, while some of the main issues such as return of all 
confiscated property, acquiring proof of Croatian citizenship and others still remain 
present in the contemporary Croatian politics.
Croatian Veterans of the Homeland War: 
The Category of “Deserving” Citizens
The story of the Croatian citizenship and debates over its identity cannot be com-
prehended without analysis of the status of one particular category of Croatian citi-
zens: veteran soldiers of the Homeland War. This category came into being from 
the reality that Croatian independence was carved out through war. In this section 
we will demonstrate how, along with the institutionalization of this category with 
the set of privileges ascribed to their status, the story of the Homeland War is con-
stantly revisited, reconstructed and reinforced as constant topic and the background 
of social and political life in Croatia. 
As Fisher argues, the close connection between the representatives of the ve-
teran soldiers’ organizations and Croatian Democratic Union date from the very 
beginning of the Homeland War (Fisher, 2003: 70), since many of the soldiers were 
also members of the party. Throughout the 1990s, there was a strong discourse on 
triadic unity between the state, the nation and the party. Veteran soldiers hence 
found a niche in support of the HDZ as the exemplifier of the state for which they 
fought.
The sacrifice, experienced individual traumas, and the gratitude for the deeds 
of defenders during the war was firstly recognized by the state in 1994 when the 
Law on rights of Croatian defenders from the Homeland War and the members of 
their families was enacted. The law defined a wide set of rights granted to this ca-
tegory, and remained in power with gradual expansion until today. Over the last two 
decades the well-organized veterans developed into a social actor who has a great 
influence on the official politics. It is especially prominent related to two political 
issues: firstly, to the debates on the scope of rights to be recognized to this category, 
and secondly, to any topic which directly or indirectly relates to the war and/or puts 
under the scrutiny the dominant narrative of the nature of the war. The latter is often 
marked by massive protests organized by the veterans’ organization. 
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In 2000, following the constitution of the first center-left government in Croa-
tia, the bond between the HDZ and veteran soldiers’ organizations established in 
the 1990s was transformed in the massive attempts for restructuring and replacing 
the government and bringing the HDZ back to power (Fisher, 2003: 71-72). Such a 
bond, depending on the political circumstances in the country, to a greater or lesser 
extent remains present until today. A sort of double standard for the evaluation of 
the role of political actors during the war is established by the veteran soldiers’ or-
ganizations: the HDZ, perceived as the pillar of Croatian independence, became 
almost immune to any serious criticism from the Croatian veteran soldiers’ organi-
zations. Nevertheless, these organizations seem to be less capable to formulate their 
standpoints into clear policy-oriented goals in comparison with their capability to 
raise the media and public attention on any Croatian-identity-related issues. Within 
their realms lies a strong political power to influence any decision regarding the 
“dignity of the Homeland War”, which includes justification of the minority poli-
cies and content of Croatian symbolic policies. 
If the differentiation of statuses and categories that develop within the particu-
lar citizenship regime, in Brubaker’s terms (2015), can be utilized as the instrument 
of accomplishing a political closure, it goes without question that setting the speci-
fic legal category for Homeland War veterans plays a very powerful role in such an 
endeavor. The image of the veteran soldier becomes a symbol of heroic deed con-
ducted by the willing individuals fighting for the highest possible goal: indepen-
dent and free Croatian state. The symbolic value of such a role is barely contested 
in the Croatian public, especially in terms of committed war crimes. 
However, the close connection of the dominant veteran soldiers’ associations 
with the conservative and right-wing political elites and their willingness to actively 
get involved in massive, often threatening protests with the aim of unconditional in-
fluence on the political and/or electoral outcomes in Croatia led to the situation where 
there are competing understandings of what the role of the veterans should be in post-
war Croatia. One of the issues that is the highest source of the controversies regarding 
this category of citizens are the rights associated to this status, which by scholars is 
often perceived in terms of specific clientelistic nexus (Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2015) 
which is the legacy of HDZ’s rule of the 1990s (Kasapović, 2001) and/or transfer of 
the wartime rules to the subsequent years (Dolenec, 2013: 142).
Croatian Citizenship Regime and EU Accession: Return of Identity
In July 2013 Croatian negotiations for EU membership were successfully brought 
to an end with Croatia becoming the 28th member state. Scholars of citizenship stu-
dies were long predicting what would be the consequences for the Croatian citizen-
ship in the new realities that included the introduction of EU citizenship as a new 
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layer to the existing regime. The external requirements imposed by the EU during 
the accession process led Croatia to enact more inclusive minority policies. Practi-
ces of exclusion of the 1990s were gradually replaced with more inclusive dis-
course, while the public became more open for alternative interpretations of the role 
of the Croatian state during the turbulent 1990s. 
However, several events before and after the Croatian accession showed that 
instead of further liberalization, the revival of nationalist and anti-liberal discourse 
of the 1990s has taken place. We provide the analysis of the three main such events 
that we believe shape the context for understanding the new sets of disputes in the 
Croatian citizenship regime, that emerged with the EU accession. These are: a) the 
final verdict of the ICTY, b) violent protests regarding the implementation of the 
CLNMR in the town of Vukovar followed by the rise of anti-Serbian rhetoric in 
public, and c) protest of the Croatian veteran soldiers against the Government which 
was portrayed as “anti-Croat and communist”.
The Verdicts of the International Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia: 
Instrument of Justice or Justification of Constitutive Stories?
One of the largest obstacles that Croatia was facing during its EU accession cam-
paign was cooperation with the ICTY. The prevalent perception in the Croatian pub-
lic was that by pressing charges against the high ranked Croatian army and political 
officials, the ICTY aimed to equalize guilt and responsibility for the war between 
the Serbian aggressor and Croatia who was a victim. The debate over the role of the 
international justice system goes beyond the scope of this paper; however, it is im-
portant to reflect on the discourses that followed the ICTY verdicts made regarding 
the case of general Ante Gotovina, the highest Croatian army official prosecuted by 
the ICTY. On the symbolic level, his trial was perceived as a final battle for the dig-
nity of the Homeland War.
In July 2001, the ICTY pressed charges against general Ante Gotovina for 
crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war commit-
ted during and in the aftermath of the military Operation Storm. The key elements 
of indictment stated that Ante Gotovina acting individually and/or in concert with 
others, including President Franjo Tuđman, planned, instigated, ordered, commit-
ted or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of per-
secutions of the Krajina Serb population.5 
Following the ICTY indictment, the ruling left-center coalition was faced with 
a double political pressure; on the one hand, the unconditional cooperation with 
5 See the full text of the indictment at: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina_old/ind/en/got-
ii010608e.htm [accessed on 20 March 2017].
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the ICTY was one of the key requirements of Croatian accession to the EU, while 
on the other, the Croatian public perceived the content of the indictment as an attack 
on the very foundations of Croatian independence and sovereignty.6 Government 
was stigmatized with qualifications which ranged from incompetency to national 
treason. Such allegations were delivered from the conservative sections of society 
including the Catholic Church in Croatia, right-wing intellectuals and a number of 
veteran soldiers’ organizations. 
However, general Gotovina was not arrested. Instead, he evaded the authorities 
and clandestinely left the country remaining outside the reach of Croatian and inter-
national authorities for four years. His arrest took place only on 7 December 2005 
after which he was immediately transferred to ICTY custody. Ironically, his arrest 
was executed by the HDZ coalition government which regained power after the 2003 
elections, where accusations against the previous government’s cooperation with the 
ICTY and its betrayal of generals and values of the Homeland War were topics on 
which major support of the public was gained. The trial began in March 2008. 
The ICTY delivered its first degree verdict on the case in April 2011. The first 
degree sentence claimed that the generals were guilty, sentencing general Ante Go-
tovina to 24 and general Mladen Markač to 18 years in prison. Such a verdict resulted 
in a sense of deep national frustration. The support for the EU accession dramatical-
ly fell to only 23% and according to the national pools there was almost unanimous 
agreement (95.4%) among the Croats that the verdict was unfair.7 However, cer-
tain segments of society were aiming to calm the situation by highlighting the fact 
that even though the atrocities committed by the Croatian side during the war hap-
pened, Croatian authorities did not do much to prosecute the perpetrators in almost 
two decades following the end of the war.8 The verdict was perceived as a unique 
opportunity for setting the framework for deliberation on the Croatian role during 
the war. 
Nevertheless, such a standpoint was silenced by the overwhelming perception 
that the international community wanted to discipline and punish Croatian inde-
pendence. Even though the Croatian president Ivo Josipović and prime minister of 
the ruling HDZ government, Jadranka Kosor, repeatedly stated that this verdict was 
not a verdict against the state, and emphasized that there was still a right to appeal, 
6 See To international actors even the Croatian independence and sovereignty are questionable 
(“Međunarodnim faktorima upitni čak i samostalnost i suverenost Hrvatske”, Jutarnji list, 24. 
7. 2001).
7 See Only 23% of Croats support Croatian accession to the EU (“Samo 23 % Hrvata za ulazak 
u EU”, Nedjeljni jutarnji, 17. 4. 2011).
8 See, for example, If Gotovina gets convicted, it will not be a verdict against Croatia (“Ako Go-
tovina i bude osuđen, to neće biti presuda Hrvatskoj”, Jutarnji list, 13. 4. 2011).
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nothing could appease the majority of the population deeply disappointed by the 
decision. This would only change in the following year when, after the appeal, the 
ICTY made its final verdict. 
In November 2012, the ICTY made its final decision according to which gene-
rals Gotovina and Markač have been exempted of all charges of the indictment. 
This time national euphoria replaced national melancholy. The photos of gene-
rals portrayed as heroes marked the front pages of the daily newspapers. Just as 
with the first verdict, the public interpretations of the decision went beyond the 
mere judicial case, and were utilized to justify the dominant narrative on the na-
ture of the Homeland War. In sum, three major conclusions in Croatian public were 
derived from the ICTY acquittal decision: firstly, political elites in power sent the 
message that with the verdict Homeland War is finally over.9 Secondly, the verdict 
was interpreted as proof that the Serb population did not forcefully (at least not due 
to the actions of Croatian authorities) leave Croatia. Finally, the right-wing intel-
ligentsia and conservative segments of society used the verdict in order to portray 
human rights organizations and liberal sections of civil society, which were raising 
the public awareness on the crimes committed by the Croatian side during the war, 
as professional enemies of the Croatian state.10 
The last two conclusions had particular impact on the developments within the 
Croatian citizenship regime. The perception that Serbs voluntarily left the coun-
try in the aftermath of the military operation Storm further consolidated the public 
stigma associated to this category of Croatian citizens; namely, in the national ima-
ginary the verdict represents judicial confirmation of the constitutive story accord-
ing to which the Serb minority, especially the sections that fled the country in 1995, 
is conceived as a threat to the Croatian state.
The second conclusion opened the venue for larger stigmatization of civil so-
ciety actors who critically evaluate the events of the 1990s. As the subsequent po-
litical events revealed, such qualifications gradually traced the terrain for re-emer-
gence of the right-wing exclusionary discourse regarding the identity dimension 
of the Croatian citizenship regime from the margins to the mainstream of Croatian 
society.
9 See the interview with the Croatian President Ivo Josipović: With this verdict the Homeland 
War is fully stopped (“Ovom presudom na Domovinski rat napokon je stavljena točka”, Jutarnji 
list, 17. 11. 2012).
10 See, for example, Ivo Josipović should be ashamed for the award given to Vesna Teršelič (“I 
Ivo Josipović bi se trebao crvenjeti zbog nagrade Vesni Teršelič”, Večernji list, 26. 11. 2012).
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The Implementation of the Constitutional Law on the Rights 
of National Minorities and Serb Minority Rights after the EU Accession 
Croatian Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities since its enact-
ment was celebrated as an example of the highest possible standards a state can 
reach in the legal protection of minorities. For instance Milan Mesić (2003) argued 
that even though in Croatia there is no clear strategic policy for development of 
durable minority and social justice, for which the minorities have their share of re-
sponsibility as much as the Croat majority, the legal standards for minority protec-
tion meet all requirements set by the international declarations and norms. Tatalović 
(2001) argued that the key criteria for evaluation of the consolidation of Croatian 
democracy and its adjustments for economic and social integration to Europe is the 
level to which the protection of minorities is granted. The accomplishment of these 
tasks was perceived as going in the right direction, as with the Constitutional Law 
and following policy measures Croatia made crucial preconditions for the strength-
ening of its international reputation and status (ibid.: 172).
However, once the external pressure of the EU was removed following the 
Croatian full membership, several events revealed that it was easier to make con-
stitutional promises than to ensure their implementation once the demographic re-
alities prescribed by the law for their implementation were met. The exemplifier 
of this case can be found in the political incidents and anti-Serb sentiments in the 
sections of Croatian public following the attempts to implement the provisions re-
garding the equal treatment of the minority script and language in public spaces in 
the town of Vukovar. 
The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities in its Article 12, 
paragraph 1, defined that the right for equal official exercise of minority language 
at the level of local self-government should be granted to those minorities who, ac-
cording to the census, constitute at least one third of the total population at the level 
of the particular unit of local self-government. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the 
same article foresaw that these provisions should be exercised in accordance with 
the statute of the unit of local self-government which is to implement such rights. 
The implementation of these provisions did not face any resistance in the lo-
cal communities who had a long experience of multi-national cooperation with the 
old minorities, such as in the case of the Italian minority in Istria. However, even 
though already at the moment of its enactment it was clear that, sooner or later, this 
right would have to be introduced for the Serb minority in one of the post-conflict 
towns where Serbs form a large section of the local population, for more than a de-
cade neither of the governments did anything to prepare the public for the imple-
mentation of these provisions. Ironically, it was in the town of Vukovar that, fol-
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lowing the 2011 census, the official use of the Serbian language and the Cyrillic 
alphabet was to be introduced.11
In 2009, at the peak of the Croatian EU negotiations, Vukovar’s local govern-
ment led by the coalition between the HDZ and the Serb minority elected changes 
to the town’s statute which foresaw the introduction of the Serbian language as the 
second official language in this town. However, the formal preconditions for trig-
gering both the provisions of the statute and the Constitutional Law were fulfilled 
only after the 2011 census data was made public. According to the census, Serbs 
formed 34.8% of Vukovar’s population. The possibility of introducing the Cyril-
lic alphabet in Vukovar was received with large animosity by the wider public, but 
mostly by the organizations of Croatian war veterans. In April 2013, a protest of 
more than 20,000 people was held at the main square in Zagreb. The protest was or-
ganized by the coordination of veteran soldiers’ organizations “The Headquarter for 
the Defense of the Croatian Vukovar” (The Headquarter), who sent the message to 
the Government: the Cyrillic alphabet is not welcomed in Vukovar and any attempt 
for its implementation will be resisted. 
In September 2013, less than two months following the Croatian accession, 
the local government of Vukovar introduced public posts in both Latin and Cyrillic 
scripts. The next day, the protest escalated into a minor conflict between the local 
police and the protesters who aimed to forcefully remove the bilingual posts. In the 
following months, The Headquarter attempted to initiate the referendum according 
to which the constitutional rights on national minorities should be altered in such a 
manner that the rights for equal exercise of minority language at the level of local 
self-government should be granted to those minorities who form more than 50% of 
the local population. In other words, such provisions would allow minorities to exer-
cise their language rights only in circumstances when they form the majority in the 
local community. The petition for referendum has collected more than 500,000 sig-
natures. However, the Constitutional Court made a decision that the proposed ques-
tion being decided on the referendum was in collision with the Croatian Constitution.
The (failure of) implementation of the language rights was an example of radi-
cal deterioration of the minority protection standards accomplished during the EU 
negotiations stage. However, the demise of the minority protection and return of 
radicalized Croat identity debates in the social mainstream, according to the inter-
views with the Serb political and social elites, were not limited only to the aspect 
11 Croatian and Serbian languages both belong to the group of Slavic languages. The similari-
ties between the two languages are very high, and authors such as Kordić (2010) argue that they 
represent the same language with different dialects. The biggest differences between Croatian 
and Serbian language are reflected in their official scripts; Croatian language uses Latin, while 
Serbian considers the Cyrilic alphabet to be its official script. 
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related to the cultural rights within the framework on the Constitutional Law on the 
Rights of National Minorities. As one of the representatives stated: “During the ne-
gotiation stage, with the cooperation between the Serbian representatives and the 
Croatian Government, the situation was getting better. ... After the accession Croa-
tia witnessed a rise of the anti-minority and anti-liberal discourse in practice.”
The progress achieved during the accession negotiations was mainly focused 
on the dimension of cultural rights recognized by the Constitutional Law. However, 
the integration obstacles that members of the Serb community face today are more 
related to the lack of access to “civic” rather than “ethnic” or “cultural” rights. The 
dominant issues that this population faces are related to the lack of equal access to 
public jobs, infrastructure, goods and services, repossession of property and issues 
related to tenancy rights. In such a context, the support for cultural rights is not cru-
cial for economic integration, but has a high symbolic meaning. It is a benchmark 
against which the readiness of society to openly redefine the role of the Serb minor-
ity in contemporary Croatia can be evaluated. Without such changes, the obstacles 
that stem from the dominant narrative of Croatian statehood will continue to pro-
duce impediments for the development of successful integration and minority poli-
cies, both for the Croatian citizens of Serb nationality abroad and members of the 
Serb minority who are still residents of Croatia.
Croatian Veterans of Homeland War Protest: 
“In 1991 against Yugoslavia, in 2014 against Yugoslavs”
The additional move towards the reintroduction of the debates on the identity di-
mension of the Croatian citizenship regime was demonstrated by the protest of the 
veteran soldiers in front of the Ministry of War Veterans. While the literature on ve-
terans in Croatia (Kasapović, 2001; Fisher, 2003; Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2015) high-
lights the close connection between the veteran organizations and the HDZ, it would 
be misleading to conclude that such protests are a mere reflection of the political 
games regarding the possible clientelistic cooperation between the veteran soldiers 
and the HDZ. The trigger for the protest was assistant minister Bojan Glavašević’s 
claim that even the civil victims of the war, including the Serb victims, should be 
treated as war victims.12 Such an intervention, however marginal, was perceived as 
blasphemy which inflicts damage to the very fiber of the Croatian society.13 The pro-
12 See, for example, The tape was misinterpreted, I was not trying to say that the victims and ag-
gressors are the same (“Glavašević: Snimka je izvučena iz konteksta, nisam izjednačavao žrtvu 
i agresora!”, Dnevnik.hr, 2. 11. 2014) [accessed on 20 March 2017].
13 See, for example, Glavašević, who are you working for and who’s paying you? (“Bojane 
Glavaševiću, odgovori za koga radiš i tko te plaća”, Braniteljski portal, 5. 8. 2015) [accessed on 
20 March 2017].
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test demonstrated that any attempt to redefine identities and categories established 
following the war will be faced with high opposition from the veteran soldiers and 
conservative sections of society. 
The protest started early in October 2014 when a tent was set overnight in front 
of the Ministry of War Veterans. The veterans were blocking the traffic, gathering 
in front of and inside the tent where they organized press conferences, live reports 
and held speeches on a daily basis. They were also sleeping, eating and socializing 
in the tent and were called “šatoraši” (tent men) by the media and part of the pub-
lic. In the beginning of the protest the veterans only gave vague statements about 
how the protest was envisioned “to help preserve the dignity of the victims, veter-
ans and families of the victims of the Homeland War”. They also demanded the re-
signation of Minister of War Veterans Predrag Matić along with his assistant Bojan 
Glavašević and deputy minister Vesna Nađ, and repeated those demands through-
out the protest.14
The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which was an opposition party at the 
time, was first to offer support to the veterans in protest, calling the current Croatian 
government led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) accountable for the position 
many veterans were in, facing issues from poverty to various psychological prob-
lems, even though the Law on the Rights of Croatian Defenders from Homeland 
War and the Members of Their Families (LRCDHWMTF) provided pensions, dis-
ability compensation, tax subsidies and various other forms of help to the veterans; 
among other means of help, they were able to apply for non-returnable grants the 
state provided, and were encouraged to enter small business ventures together. 
Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanović on several occasions offered to meet 
the protesters, expressing his willingness to open a dialogue, but emphasized that 
under no circumstances was he going to release Minister Matić from duty.15 Soon the 
veterans increased their demands, rooting for implementation of the LRCDHWMTF 
in the Croatian Constitution, where all their benefits would remain intact. 
As the protest continued and grew bigger in scale, it started to obtain a more 
violent discourse in the form of marches, presenting symbols and marks on the ve-
teran uniforms, with threatening rhetoric used by leaders of the protest in their pub-
lic announcements and when addressing the government. The same threats were 
used towards the part of the public they claimed to be “anti-Croat” and communist, 
14 See, for example, War veterans demand Glavašević and Matić to resign (“Prosvjed ratnih in-
valida: Tražimo ostavke Matića i Glavaševića!”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 20. 10. 2014) [accessed 
on 20 March 2017].
15 See, for example, Veterans are important to us, but we will not abandon Matić (“Milanović: 
Branitelji su nam važni, ali nećemo se odreći Matića”, tportal, 8. 6. 2015) [accessed on 20 March 
2017].
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especially Serb minority representatives in the Croatian Parliament, humanitarian 
and human-rights-oriented non-governmental organizations, parts of academia and 
left-oriented public figures in Croatian society. Such was the reference used by one 
of the protest leaders, when he reminded of so-called Bloody Easter, which was an 
event that took place during the Homeland War, with a non-subtle notion that it was 
possible to reenact those events if the protest should get “out of hand”.16 Slogans 
such as: “In 1991 against Yugoslavia, in 2014 against Yugoslavs” were used in or-
der to remind the public that, in a manner of speaking, the Homeland War was not 
over, but was simply led by other means, and that the so-called enemy of Croatian 
sovereignty and independence was still present in the legislative and governmental 
institutions, but also in the media, influenced and supported from abroad.
In Lieu of a Conclusion
The literature on Europeanization has demonstrated the limitations of the EU sys-
tem of conditionality to impose or direct the policies of the candidate countries af-
ter they become full EU member states (Vachudova, 2008; Epstein and Sedelmeier, 
2008). While, during the accession, candidate countries do seek to achieve a na-
tional unity in order to adopt and adjust to the political and economic requirements 
set by EC, and hence push the radical nationalist and anti-democratic discourses to 
the edge of the official public debates, the situation may alter after the country be-
comes a member state.
As Stubbs and Zrinščak (2015: 403) argue, EU disciplinarities focus mostly 
on economic conditionalities, while the tendencies present in many Central Euro-
pean countries, such as a slow down of democratization processes, remain outside 
the EU’s political influence. In such a context, as the Croatian case reveals, the de-
velopments achieved during the negotiation stage fully depend on the states’ and 
societies’ internal capacities to build on the political accomplishment during the ne-
gotiation and internalize such changes into the social and political fabric of society. 
The legacy of the constitutive stage of Croatian statehood has produced a num-
ber of contentious categories of Croatian citizens, such as the Serb minority and 
Croatian defenders of the Homeland War. The political foundations of the war as 
the constitutive story of the modern Croatian statehood did attribute a symbolical 
role to each of these categories in the construction of the Croatian national narra-
tive. We may argue that these positions have not been refuted, but instead reinforced 
after the Croatian accession. The experiences of the first three years of Croatian 
EU membership go in line with somewhat pessimistic characterizations, which de-
16 See, for example, We want Milanović’s and Matić’s apology (“Klemm: Tražimo da se Milanović 
i Matić ispričaju hrvatskim braniteljima”, Vijesti RTL, 5. 12. 2014) [accessed on 20 March 2017].
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fine Croatia as ethnic democracy (Štiks, 2010b). Ethnic democracy, according to 
Smooha (2002) is a regime which, among its features, promotes ethnic ascendancy 
and nurtures the perception of particular ethnic minorities as threats to statehood.
If, as Štiks argues, these features were present in Croatia during the pre-ac-
cession period where the media perpetuated the Serbian threat even though large 
sections of the Serb population had left the country, such discourse has exponen-
tially spread in Croatian mainstream following the accession. However, the (re)in-
troduction of the identity debates within the Croatian citizenship regime after the 
accession did not focus solely on the Serb minority; the actors within the debate 
(re)invent the threat even in the sections of civil society and Croatian citizenry who 
critically engage with the unidimensional narrative of the nature of Croatian state-
hood and democracy. 
Such discourse was particularly dominant during the (failed) government 
formed by the HDZ and the coordination of independent lists MOST elected in the 
2015 elections, which lasted only until the early elections in September 2016. How-
ever, during this period, the symbolic policies of the 1990s were reintroduced in the 
dominant HDZ discourse and the rule of this government was marked with the re-
duction of state funding for non-profit media and civil society, heated anti-minority 
rhetoric and even revisionist attempts regarding the nature of the Croatian quisling 
state during WWII.
The existing literature that targets the specific nature of Croatian politics re-
lated to the citizen categories that emerged during the constitutive stage of Cro-
atian statehood and from the Homeland War, often analyzes these constellations 
through the lens of the client-patron nexus established during the 1990s (Stubbs 
and Zrinščak, 2015; Dolenec, 2013; Kasapović, 2001). These approaches fruitfully 
address important aspects of the issues, and certainly allow better understanding of 
Croatian party politics and obstacles in reforming the welfare system. 
However, citizenship-related disputes go beyond mere instrumental and materi-
al goals. As the preliminary findings from interviews with veteran soldiers revealed, 
the main issues of those who are on the margins of society do not lie in the lack of 
social rights, but in their inability to contribute to society. If left on the margins, such 
segments of the population do end up in the client-patron nexus, but not by their own 
choice. Dependence on state subsidies is the only outcome for those who do not have 
any choice. Justification for such a position cannot be conceived by any other mean 
than the reintroduction of the issues regarding the dignity of the Homeland War in 
everyday politics. The reiteration of such narrative ultimately leads to a stronger in-
stitutional embeddedness of the differences of the citizenship categories, rather than 
provide a venue for the establishment of a more inclusive citizenship regime. How 
these realities of the Croatian citizenship regime will respond to the emerging migra-
tion crisis and consequences of the Brexit, remains to be seen. 
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